Efficient Provision of Public Goods With Endogenous Redistribution∗

نویسندگان

  • Luca Anderlini
  • Paolo Siconolfi
چکیده

We study a balanced mechanism that is capable of implementing in Nash equilibrium all the Pareto-efficient individually rational allocations for an economy with public goods. The Government chooses a set of weights directly related to the Lindahl prices corresponding to the Paretoefficient allocation to be implemented. The mechanism then guarantees that initial endowments are re-allocated so that the chosen vector of Lindahl prices is indeed a Lindahl equilibrium, and implements the corresponding Lindahl allocation. Finally, besides being balanced, our mechanism is ‘simple’. Each agent has to declare a desired increase in the amount of public good, and a vector of redistributive transfers of initial endowments (across other agents). JEL Classification: C79, H21, H30, H41.

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تاریخ انتشار 2003