Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations

Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations RM / 09 / 024

Query auctions are iterative auctions in which bidders have to select in each round an action from a finite set. We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running time of the auction is infinite for almost all realizations of valuations of the bidders. Thus, when valuati...

Rudolf Müller , Dries Vermeulen Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations

Inefficiency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous valuations - Extended Abstract

Query auctions are (iterative) auctions in which bidders have to select (in each round) from a finite set of actions. We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post efficient when the running time of the auction is infinite for almost all realizations of valuations of the bidders. In contrast w...

Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions

We study the efficiency of sequential first-price item auctions at (subgame perfect) equilibrium. This auction format has recently attracted much attention, with previous work establishing positive results for unit-demand valuations and negative results for submodular valuations. This leaves a large gap in our understanding between these valuation classes. In this work we resolve this gap on th...

On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations. We extend our results to the...