Guide to Chapter Seven of Gareth Evans ’ The Varieties of Reference
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چکیده
In this chapter Evans discusses ‘I’-ideas. They are similar to ‘here’-Ideas and ‘that’-Ideas in that they pivot on functional connections to perception and action. But they differ in key respects. First, unlike ‘that’-Ideas, the connections can be latent. And second, unlike ‘here’or ‘that-Ideas, there is only one object tracked as ‘I’, which makes the cognitive worklaod easier, but introduces issues concerning identity through time. Also like these other modes of thinking, ‘I’-thinking is IF. There are several primary topics. First, ‘I’ does refer. Some arguments to the contrary have concluded that it does not bcause no object is identified, but Evans points out that this is a consequencs of their IF status. The information doesn’t identify the subject, but it is identified by the Idea that the information is linked to. Second, memory supports IF ‘I’-thinking, despite some arguments to the contrary. These contrary arguments move from the fact that in some cases (where q-memories are involved) the identity can be questioned “Someone was captured by the KGB, but was it me who was captured?” to the conclusion that in the normal case they are cased on an identity. Third, Evans points out that while some have felt that IEM applies only to psychological predicates, Evans shows that in fact ther eis no assymetry between physical and psychological predicates with resepct to their potential identification-freedom. Bodily self-ascription inlcludes not only predicates about one’s physical body, but also about one’s location. For example, I come to know that I am next to a tree based entirely on IF visual experience of a tree (“Somene is standing beore a tree, but is it me who is standing before a tree?”). And this is crucial for one’s ability to locate onself in space, and hence the adequacy of one’s I-Idea. The ascription of psychological predicates, such as beliefs and experiences, is also IF.
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تاریخ انتشار 2016