LDYIS: a Framework for Model Checking Security Protocols
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a formalism for the automatic verification of security protocols based on multi-agent systems semantics. We give the syntax and semantics of a temporal-epistemic securityspecialised logic and provide a lazy-intruder model for the protocol rules that we argue to be particularly suitable for verification purposes. We exemplify the technique by finding a (known) bug in the traditional NSPK protocol.
منابع مشابه
A short introduction to two approaches in formal verification of security protocols: model checking and theorem proving
In this paper, we shortly review two formal approaches in verification of security protocols; model checking and theorem proving. Model checking is based on studying the behavior of protocols via generating all different behaviors of a protocol and checking whether the desired goals are satisfied in all instances or not. We investigate Scyther operational semantics as n example of this...
متن کاملTowards Provable Security for Data Transmission Protocols in Sensor Network
This paper presents a framework to analyze the security of data transmission protocols in wireless sensor network. This framework defines three attack models in terms of the adversary’s attacking ability, and provides an ideal model to verify whether a given protocol is secure or not under these three different attack models. Furthermore, we give a formal security definition under different att...
متن کاملUsing Predicate-based Model Checker for Verifying E-Commerce Protocols
Over the past decade, researchers have demonstrated that the technique of model checking can be extremely effective when applied to security or e-commerce protocols. Model checking is the process of determining whether a formal model of the analyzed system satisfies a correctness property specified as a temporal logic formula. Model checking result is either a claim that the property is true or...
متن کاملClassical Security Protocols for QKD Systems
The purpose of this report is to document the three principal classes of classic cryptographic protocols which are needed in systems for quantum key distribution. We will detail the protocols used for secretkey reconciliation by public discussion, privacy ampli cation by public discussion, and unconditionally secure authentication. We suggest the use of the model checking method for the analys...
متن کاملTPMC: A Model Checker For Time-Sensitive Security Protocols
In this paper we consider the problem of verifying time–sensitive security protocols, where temporal aspects explicitly appear in the description. In previous work, we proposed Timed HLPSL, an extension of the specification language HLPSL (originally developed in the Avispa Project), where quantitative temporal aspects of security protocols can be specified. In this work, a model checking tool,...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
- Fundam. Inform.
دوره 85 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008