Everybody Stay Cool, This Is a Robbery

Data aggregation across time and space, and endogeneity of crime policies have rendered identification of Becker’s model of criminal behavior quite arduous. This paper uses unique data on the benefits of individual crimes, in particular, 5,000 Italian bank robberies, to identify deterrence. Bank robbers behave according to an instantaneous version of Becker’s model of crime: during bank robberies, both, the probability of apprehension and the average haul increase over time. Unique data on the chosen length (in minutes) of successful and unsuccessful bank robberies allow me to test the rationality of criminal behavior, and to isolate the distribution of criminals’ disutility of ending up in jail. The distribution is positively skewed and resembles a typical earnings distribution. This result suggests that small scale antipoverty programs might lead to a substantial reduction in bank robberies. Moreover, the relationship between the modus operandi of bank robberies and the derived disutility of jail time is consistent with the existence of general deterrence. Bank robbers appear to be well informed about specific sentence enhancements that are spelled out in the Italian penal code.