Shapley values in random weighted voting games
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چکیده
Shapley values, also known as Shapley–Shubik indices, measure the power that agents have in a weighted voting game. Suppose that agent weights are chosen randomly according to some distribution. We show that the expected Shapley values for the smallest and largest agent are independent of the quota for a large range of quotas, and converge exponentially fast to an explicit value depending only on the distribution. The proof makes a surprising use of renewal theory.
منابع مشابه
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تاریخ انتشار 2016