Coarse Correlated Equilibria in Duopoly Games

نویسنده

  • SONALI SEN GUPTA
چکیده

Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder.he would have been really happy to see me develop into an academic, as he himself was a great scholar and extremely passionate about learning and teaching. 3 Acknowledgments It gives me great pleasure to have finally reached the day when I can officially thank all those people who have been there with me during all these years. The years of my doctoral studies have played an important role in an overall development of my intellect and personality and I am grateful to everyone who has been a part of my journey. I would first like to start by thanking my (lead) supervisor Indrajit Ray who has been solely responsible for all my professional achievements. He has been a great mentor and has provided me with his guidance throughout. He has always been extremely patient and encouraging and I will always be indebted to him for all the support he has provided me during these years. I have no doubt in saying that he is one of the best supervisors one can get and I am extremely lucky to be his student. I would also like to thank Martin Jensen for being an excellent (second) supervisor and for providing me with all his guidance and support in all my academic ventures. Many thanks to Matthew Cole, David Maddison, Jayasri Dutta and Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay for all the encouragement and useful advices, and my healt-felt thanks to Emma, Jackie, Wendy, Lisa, Rita and Marleen for all the 5 6 Acknowledgments administrative help they have provided during my Masters and Doctoral studies in Birmingham. A special thanks to Herve Moulin. I am very fortunate to have such a well respected member of economics community as my co-author, collaborator and mentor. I am highly indebted to him for all the guidance he had provided and I am thankful to him for patiently correcting all my (silly) mistakes. I have learned a lot from him. I am grateful to Chirantan Ganguly and Herakles Polemarchakis for their valuable suggestions and helpful comments on the papers forming this thesis. the interesting conversations during coffee breaks, drinks, and dinner outings. I have had a great time with you all. I express my …

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تاریخ انتشار 2014