Common Value Auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
Last week, we relaxed both private values and independence of types, using the Milgrom-Weber setting of affiliated signals. And established the “linkage principle”: that linking the winning bidder’s payment to more things besides his own bid (his opponents’ bids, or other information revealed by the seller) increases expected revenue. Recall our original benchmark model: symmetric independent private values with risk-neutral bidders.
منابع مشابه
Optimal Agendas for Sequential Auctions for Common and Private Value Objects
This paper analyzes sequential auctions for objects that have both common and private values. Existing work has studied sequential auctions for objects that are either exclusively common or private value. However, in many cases, an object has both features. Now, in such cases, the common value (which is the same for all bidders) depends on each bidder’s valuation of the object. But, generally s...
متن کاملCommon Value Auctions with Voluntary Entry
In a lab experiment, we assess the role of voluntary entry on the incidence of severe overbidding and bankruptcies, which are widespread in common value auctions. We show that voluntary entry amplifies overbidding and reduces auction profits. Less experienced, male and more risk averse subjects tend to enter the common value auctions.
متن کاملCommon Value Auctions and the Winner’s Curse: Lessons from the Economics Laboratory*
Russell Sage Foundation are gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks to my colleagues and my coauthors, especially Dan Levin, who have taught me so much. Much of the material here is taken from our more comprehensive survey titled " Bidding in Common Value Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research, " which appears as Chapter 1 in the collection of our published papers investigating common valu...
متن کاملAlmost Common Values Auctions Revisited*
In almost common value auctions one bidder (the advantaged bidder) has a valuation advantage over all other (regular) bidders. It is well known that in second-price auctions with two bidders, even a slight private value advantage can have an explosive effect on auction outcomes as the advantaged bidder wins all the time and auction revenue is substantially lower than in a pure secondprice commo...
متن کاملLevel-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
This paper proposes a structural non-equilibrium model of initial responses to incompleteinformation games based on "level-k" thinking, which describes behavior in many experiments with complete-information games. We derive the model's implications in firstand second-price auctions with general information structures, compare them to equilibrium and Eyster and Rabin's (2005) "cursed equilibrium...
متن کاملAsymmetric Common Value Auctions with Applications to Auctions with Resale
We study a model of common value auctions in which bidders’ private information are independently and asymmetrically distributed. We provide two sufficient conditions under which a first-price auction generates higher revenue than a second-price auction (for a selected equilibrium). A necessary condition is given for this revenue-ranking result to hold in general. We illustrate that in a first-...
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تاریخ انتشار 2008