Motivations to Innovate in Public Organizations

Motivation is a central issue in many theories of the behavior of public officials (see, for controversy surrounding efforts to model the motivations of public officials is the extent to which their behavior is driven by self interest in contrast to altruism (Mansbridge, 1990). Some theories argue that the behavior of public officials can be understood as narrowly self interested. Others contend that much of observed behavior in the public realm can be understood only if citizens and policymakers are motivated by altruistic considerations. This chapter investigates empirically the motivations of public officials in a particular context-the decision to innovate. Although the motivations of public officials appear to be important for understanding the choices that are made about innovations (Nelson and Winter, l977; 1982), researchers have been content to infer motives from innovation decisions rather than measure them more directly. This study examines a number of motives that have been identified as important in the innovation adoption process and that have been associated with varying degrees of self interest. It uses a policy capturing methodology to identify the underlying structure of these motives and how they differ among local government officials making decisions about computer applications. Research on innovations has occupied the attention of large numbers of social scientists in many disciplines. Everett Rogers aptly notes in the preface to the third edition of Diffusion of Innovations (1983, p. xv) that "there is almost no other field of behavior science that represents more effort by more scholars in more nations." The focus of this study is on one important dimension of the innovation literature, the motivation to innovate. 3 1982) suggest that the motivation to innovate is an important component of the innovation process. They argue that innovation is purposive, but inherently stochastic. They use the concept of selection environment to organize the different factors that determine how relative use of different technologies changes over time. In nonmarket settings, the selection environment essentially consists of three primary elements: the motivations of organizations in the sector, the ways in which consumers (usually voters) and financers (usually legislators) constrain agency behavior, and the mechanisms of information and value sharing among organizations in the investment and imitation process. Nelson and Winter (1977) suggest that the selection environment in nonmarket settings is quite different from market settings. One reason is that the separation of interests between firms and customers is not as sharply defined …