Supplementary Material for Monotonicity and Implementability
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چکیده
1 Domains with Convex Closure Saks and Yu (2005) proved that if D is convex then every monotone deterministic allocation rule is implementable. We prove in this appendix the following generalization of their result: Theorem 1 Every domain with a convex closure is a proper monotonicity domain.
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تاریخ انتشار 2010