Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?

The main aim of this essay is to provide an approach to the analysis of the link between Thorstein Veblen’s evolutionary approach and Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT). Analysing this connection we expect to shed some light on the potential contribution of Veblen’s theory of socio-economic evolution to the discussion on the application of EGT to social environments. We also attempt to investigate to what extent elements of EGT can be used to formalise some of the basic evolutionary principles proposed by Veblen. In order to study these issues, the paper has been structured as follows: in the first section, the methodological imperatives laid down by Veblen, defining an evolutionary approach, are presented. The main idea in this section is to provide an analytical framework that allows the evaluation of EGT in terms of Veblen’s evolutionary approach. To better understand the main principles and rationale behind EGT and how it can be applied as a tool for analysing issues on the diversity, interaction, and evolution of social systems, the second section presents a discussion of this non-traditional approach and its basic concepts. Finally, in the third section the main characteristics of EGT previously discussed are contrasted with Veblen’s principles outlined in the first part of the paper. JEL Classification: B15, B52, C72, D62,