Goldman on Knowledge as True Belief

(2002a, 183) distinguishes the following four putative uses or senses of 'knowledge': (1) Knowledge = belief (2) Knowledge = institutionalized belief (3) Knowledge = true belief (4) Knowledge = justified true belief (plus) 1 (1) and (2) he characterizes as " loose " uses or senses of 'knowledge'; by 'loose', he means " an extended, technical use that departs from the standard, colloquial senses. " (183) He claims that (1) and (2) are " employed by sociologists of knowledge and a variety of other researchers (including cognitive scientists, for example) who do not aim to conform to standard usage. " (183) By contrast, he characterizes (3) and (4) as " strict " uses or senses of 'knowledge'; by 'strict' he means a use or sense " that conforms to some standard, ordinary sense of the term in colloquial English (as judged by what epistemologists who attend to ordinary usage have identified as such). " (183) He claims that (3) and (4) are typically advanced by one or more philosophers. Goldman acknowledges that mainstream philosophical epistemologists almost all concur that (i) belief or opinion alone does not suffice for knowledge, (ii) truth is required for knowledge, and (iii) true belief does not qualify for knowledge " unless it is justified, warranted, or acquired in some suitable fashion (e.g., by reliable methods). " (183)