Can Evolutionary Dynamics Explain Free Riding in Experiments?
نویسندگان
چکیده
Free riding experiments have generated many anomalous results that cannot be explained with standard Nash equilibrium models of public goods. This paper examines the experiments within the context of evolutionary game theory. This approach models the decision process of agents by an adaptive learning algorithm. The algorithm ‘strengthens’ strategies that do relatively well and ‘weakens’ strategies that do relatively poorly. This model produces predictions that are strikingly similar to those generated by experiments. Hence, evolutionary game theory may provide a way to understanding otherwise anomalous observations on contributions to public goods.
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تاریخ انتشار 1991