Subnational Government Bailouts in Germany

نویسندگان

  • Helmut Seitz
  • Felipe Herrera
چکیده

The views and interpretations in this document are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Inter-American Development Bank, or to any individual acting on its behalf. The Research Department (RES) publishes the Latin American Economic Policies Newsletter, as well as working papers and books, on diverse economic issues. To obtain a complete list of RES publications and read or download them, please visit our web site at: 4. Bailouts of Local Governments in Germany 5. Conclusions

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تاریخ انتشار 2000