Distributed Methods for Computing Approximate Equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a new, distributed method to compute approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. In contrast to previous approaches that analyze the two payoff matrices at the same time (for example, by solving a single LP that combines the two players payoffs), our algorithm first solves two independent LPs, each of which is derived from one of the two payoff matrices, and then compute approximate Nash equilibria using only limited communication between the players. Our method has several applications for improved bounds for efficient computations of approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. First, it yields a best polynomial-time algorithm for computing approximate wellsupported Nash equilibria (WSNE), which guarantees to find a 0.6528WSNE in polynomial time. Furthermore, since our algorithm solves the two LPs separately, it can be used to improve upon the best known algorithms in the limited communication setting: the algorithm can be implemented to obtain a randomized expected-polynomial-time algorithm that uses poly-logarithmic communication and finds a 0.6528-WSNE. The algorithm can also be carried out to beat the best known bound in the query complexity setting, requiring O(n log n) payoff queries to compute a 0.6528-WSNE. Finally, our approach can also be adapted to provide the best known communication efficient algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria: it uses poly-logarithmic communication to find a 0.382-approximate Nash equilibrium.
منابع مشابه
Approximate and Well-supported Approximate Nash Equilibria of Random Bimatrix Games
We focus on the problem of computing approximate Nash equilibria and well-supported approximate Nash equilibria in random bimatrix games, where each player's payoffs are bounded and independent random variables, not necessarily identically distributed, but with common expectations. We show that the completely mixed uniform strategy profile, i.e. the combination of mixed strategies (one per play...
متن کاملComputing Approximate Equilibria in Graphical Games on Arbitrary Graphs
We present PureProp: a new constraint satisfaction algorithm for computing pure-strategy approximate Nash equilibria in complete information games. While this seems quite limited in applicability, we show how PureProp unifies existing algorithms for 1) solving a class of complete information graphical games with arbitrary graph structure for approximate Nash equilibria (Kearns et al., 2001; Ort...
متن کاملComputing equilibria in in"nite-horizon "nance economies: The case of one asset
We develop methods to compute equilibria in dynamic models with incomplete asset markets and heterogeneous agents. Using spline interpolation methods we approximate recursive trading policies of the agents and the equilibrium pricing functions. We explore various methods for determining the coe$cients of these approximations, including time iteration methods and acceleration techniques. Explori...
متن کاملComputing equilibria in discounted dynamic games
Game theory (GT) is an essential formal tool for interacting entities; however computing equilibria in GT is a hard problem. When the same game can be played repeatedly over time, the problem becomes even more complicated. The existence of multiple game states makes the problem of computing equilibria in such games extremely difficult. In this paper, we approach this problem by first proposing ...
متن کاملImprecise Minority-Based Full Adder for Approximate Computing Using CNFETs
Nowadays, the portable multimedia electronic devices, which employ signal-processing modules, require power aware structures more than ever. For the applications associating with human senses, approximate arithmetic circuits can be considered to improve performance and power efficiency. On the other hand, scaling has led to some limitations in performance of nanoscale circuits. According...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2016