Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
نویسنده
چکیده
We apply the idea of partial honesty, first introduced by Dutta and Sen [Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals, Game Econ. Behav. 74 (2012) 154-169.] in a complete information setting, to environments with incomplete information. We show that with private values and at least three individuals, incentive compatibility and no veto power are together sufficient for full implementation without any further restrictions if all individuals are partially honest. With common values, however, an additional assumption called private best alternatives is needed. This condition holds, for example, in most standard resource allocation problems. JEL Classification: C72; D71; D78
منابع مشابه
Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule (SCR) that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper o§ers a compl...
متن کاملNash implementation with partially honest individuals
We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of “partially honest” individuals. A partially honest player is one who has a strict preference for revealing the true state over lying when truthtelling does not lead to a worse outcome (according to preferences in the true state) than that which obtains when lying. We show that when there are at least three individuals, the pre...
متن کاملPartially - honest Nash implementation with non - connected honesty standards ∗
An individual may display an honesty standard which allows her to lie a little without that being harmful to her self view as an honest person. On this basis, the paper considers a society with a finite number of individuals involving partially-honest individuals and in which every individual has her own honesty standard. An individual honesty standard is modeled as a subgroup of the society, i...
متن کاملSecurely implementable social choice rules with partially honest agents
We define secure implementation with partially honest agents in a social choice model and we show that strategy-proofness is a necessary and sufficient condition for it. This result offers a behavioral foundation for rectangularity ; and it remains valid even with only one partially honest agent. We apply the concept to a single-crossing voting environment, and we prove that it characterizes th...
متن کاملSelecting winners with partially honest jurors
We analyze the problem of choosing the w contestants who will win a competition within a group of n > w competitors when all the jurors commonly observe who the w best contestants are, but they may be biased and some of these jurors are partially honest. We use two notions of honesty, one of which is linked to the unbiasedness of the juror. The other stronger notion, requires a partially honest...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 43 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014