Ix. Ethical Egoism and Psychological Dispositions

IN their endeavors to show that ethical egoism is an unacceptable moral theory, moral philosophers have tended to argue that either (a) the theory is internally inconsistent, (b) an ethical egoist is committed to a form of solipsism, or (c) the theory cannot, properly speaking, be considered a moral theory.l It would seem, though, that such arguments have not been particularly persuasive. However, my objective in this essay in not to examine these arguments in order to determine which, if any, succeeds. Rather, I wish to attempt yet another argument against the theory or, at any rate, to present an old one in new garb.2 To state the obvious, moral theories tell us what we morally ought to do; and therefore, how we should be disposed to act. Thus, it would seem that a moral theory must be unacceptable if the sorts of dispositions which it requires us to have are such that, given our psychological make-up as healthy persons, we are unable to have them. Ethical egoism, I believe, is unacceptable on just this account. To show that this is so is the objective of this essay.