N ° 2009 - 20 The public management of risk : Separating ex ante and ex post monitors
نویسندگان
چکیده
When a firm undertakes risky activities, the conflict between social and private incentives to exercise safety care requires public intervention. This control takes the form of both monetary incentives but also monitoring taking place either ex ante or ex post, i.e., before or after an accident occurs. We delineate the respective scopes of these monitoring activities when public monitors are either benevolent or corruptible. Separation between the ex ante and the ex post monitors helps to prevent capture, increases the likelihood of ex post investigation and improves welfare.
منابع مشابه
An ex ante control chart for project monitoring using earned duration management observations
In the past few years, there has been an increasing interest in developing project control systems. The primary purpose of such systems is to indicate whether the actual performance is consistent with the baseline and to produce a signal in the case of non-compliance. Recently, researchers have shown an increased interest in monitoring project’s performance indicators, by plotting them on the S...
متن کاملOptimal Choice and Beliefs with Ex Ante Savoring and Ex Post Disappointment
We propose a new decision criterion under risk in which people extract both utility from anticipatory feelings ex ante and disutility from disappointment ex post. The decision maker chooses his degree of optimism, given that more optimism raises both the utility of ex ante feelings and the risk of disappointment ex post. We characterize the optimal beliefs and the preferences under risk generat...
متن کاملEx-ante Impact Study on the Integrated Natural Resources Management in the Middle East and North Africa Region Rangelands Rehabilitation Project in Iran
The purpose of the Integrated Natural Resources Management program in the Middle East and North Africa Region (MENARID) is to bring national investment projects in the field of Integrated Natural Resource Management (INRM). The impact evaluation study tests whether the selected technology has significantly contributed to restore and maintain of the ecosystem functions and productivity, and whet...
متن کاملINFORMATION ACQUISITION AND EFFICIENT MECHANISM DESIGN BY DIRK BERGEMANN and JUUSO VÄLIMÄKI COWLES FOUNDATION PAPER NO. 1038 COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
1 We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient allocation conditional on the private information ex-post. It is shown that in every private value envir...
متن کاملOptimal IMF Policy with Private Capital Flows
This paper characterizes optimal IMF policy in an environment with moral hazard followed by adverse selection. In our framework, government actions to improve domestic productivity are not always e¤ective, and the government learns of the success of its actions before foreign investors. Without the IMF, it is not possible for foreign investors to discern the quality of the domestic production s...
متن کامل