CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #7: Multi-Parameter Mechanism Design and the VCG Mechanism∗

Algorithmic Mechanism Design Through the lens of Multi-unit auctions

Mechanism Design is a sub-field of game theory that aims to design games whose equilibria have desired properties such as achieving high efficiency or high revenue. Algorithmic Mechanism Design is a subfield that lies on the border of Mechanism Design and Computer Science and deals with Mechanism Design in algorithmically-complex scenarios that are often found in computational settings such as ...

Simple Near - Optimal Auctions Lecture # 7 : Multi - Parameter Mechanism Design and the VCG Mechanism Lecture # 8 : Combinatorial and Wireless Spectrum Auctions

CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #5: Revenue-Maximizing Auctions∗

over all feasible outcomes (x1, . . . , xn) in some set X. Revenue is generated in welfaremaximizing auctions, but only as a side effect, a necessary evil to incentivize participants to report their private information. This lecture begins our discussion of auctions that are explicitly designed to raise as much revenue as possible. We started with the welfare objective for several reasons. One ...

CMSC 858F: Algorithmic Game Theory Fall 2010 Frugality & Profit Maximization in Mechanism Design

Recall from the previous lecture that in combinatorial auction each bidder has an associated real-valued valuation function V defined for each subset of items S. An allocation of items S1, S2, . . . , Sn among the bidders with valuation function V1, V2, . . . , Vn respectively is socially efficient if the allocation maximizes the social welfare ∑ i Vi(Si). Combinatorial auction is a very genera...

CS364A: Algorithmic Game Theory Lecture #20: Mixed Nash Equilibria and PPAD-Completeness∗

Today we continue our study of the limitations of learning dynamics and polynomial-time algorithms for converging to and computing equilibria. Recall that we have sweeping positive results for coarse correlated and correlated equilibria, which are tractable in arbitrary games. We have only partial positive results for pure Nash equilibria of routing and congestion games, and last lecture we dev...