Routing Network Flow Among Selfish Agents
نویسنده
چکیده
We consider the problems posed by routing flow in a network populated by self-interested agents. Standard node-cost and edge-cost network models are compared and a mapping between them is described. The existence of Nash equilibria when flow cannot be split is established in several cases. Braess’s paradox is shown to exist when the number of users is finite and flow is unsplittable. Finally, optimizing the flow routing with polynomial and capacity cost functions is shown to be hard to compute and to approximate.
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تاریخ انتشار 2004