Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games
نویسنده
چکیده
We compare the properties of several notions of perfectness within classes of compact, metric, and (possibly) discontinuous games, and show that in the presence of payoff discontinuities, standard notions of perfectness may fail a weakening of admissibility termed limit admissibility. We also provide conditions ensuring the existence of a limit admissible perfect equilibrium. These conditions apply in a variety of economic games.
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تاریخ انتشار 2010