ON A MARKOV GAME WITH ONE-SIDED INCOMPLETE INFORMATION By
نویسندگان
چکیده
We apply the average cost optimality equation to zero-sum Markov games, by considering a simple game with one-sided incomplete information that generalizes an example of Aumann and Maschler (1995). We determine the value and identify the optimal strategies for a range of parameters.
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تاریخ انتشار 2009