Do Incentives for REIT Executives Improve Efficiency?
نویسنده
چکیده
Using 1998-2005 EXECUCOMP data on Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) CEOs, this study addresses some of the issues that arise when modeling CEO incentive-based compensation. The purpose is to investigate how profit efficiencies are impacted by CEO compensation and their composition of pay packages. Since a disproportionate amount of a REITs expenses are executive compensation related, this issue is particularly important. Much of the literature focuses on estimating the impact of firm and CEO characteristics on CEO compensation. We consider the more direct question of whether total CEO compensation or the mix of compensation affects profit efficiency.
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