Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: On what domains are they also sufficient?

نویسندگان

  • Salvador Barberà
  • Dolors Berga
  • Bernardo Moreno
چکیده

Article history: Received 4 August 2011 Available online 2 March 2012 JEL classification: D71

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Games and Economic Behavior

دوره 75  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2012