Deontic Conditionals: Weak and Strong*

Discussions of the Miners Puzzle have prompted renewed interest in how deontic modals can be sensitive to relevant information. Linguistic phenomena involving information-sensitivity have beenused tomotivate general claims about the interpretation of modals and conditionals. These generalizations have been premature. Theorists have focused on a limited range of cases. Nearly all examples use weak necessity modals (‘ought’, ‘should’), and little if any attention is paid to how context affects speakers’ judgments. This leaves existing theories ill-equipped to capture further data (presented in this paper) involving possibility modals and strong necessity modals in a range of discourse contexts. Indeed I argue that puzzles concerning information-sensitivity arise because of features unique to weak necessity modals. We can explain the data concerning information-sensitivity without revising our understanding of modals and conditionals in general. All that is needed is an independently motivated semantics forweaknecessitymodals. Considering the broader spectrum of examples elucidates the variety of expressive resources at our disposal for coordinating our actions and expectations in conversation, deliberation,