CARESS Working Paper # 95 - 18 The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information

CARESS Working Paper #95-16 CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA AND LOCAL INTERACTIONS

Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria

This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibriu...

CARESS Working Paper #96-01 Multiplicity of Equilibria

In the present paper a pure exchange, general equilibrium model is considered and the equilibrium set is studied. It is shown for all total endowments and an open and dense set of preferences that if there are l ̧ 2 commodities and m ̧ 2 consumers then there exists a set of distributions of endowments with nonempty interior such that the associated economies have at least l¡1+minfl;mg equilibri...

CARESS Working Paper 00-09 TIME AND UNCERTAINTY IN OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS ECONOMIES

This paper shows the general reversibility of every perfect foresight equilibrium of an overlapping generations economy. It then shows and characterizes the existence of reversible sunspot equilibria in these economies as well, which seems to be at odds with our intuition about the irreversibility of a tree of events. Although the paper establishes also that such reversible stochastic equilibri...

Informational Robustness of Competitive Equilibria

Consider an exchange economy with complete information. We perturb this economy by assuming that each agent’s observation about the true state of the world is noisy. The paper investigates the robustness of equilibria of the complete information economy with respect to incomplete information. We provide conditions under which complete information equilibria are limits of equilibria of the econo...