Lower-level Cognition in Emotions

The cognitive theory of emotions maintains that emotions necessarily involve cognition, and typically considers emotions as judgment in higher forms (or, in the form of complex appraisal judgments). It is especially in the form of thoughts, beliefs, conceptualization and propositional attitudes. Such a theory is challenged by somatic theory, which conversely regards emotions as non-cognitive, by taking emotions to be effects (or sensations) of neural responses to changes of bodily states. Reasons taken to support the somatic theory typically resorts to the affective phenomena that seem to lack cognition at all. The present paper, in contrast, aims to argue that even such affective phenomena remain cognitive, because they have guidance of actions that is immanent in emotions. It is, however, not cognitive in the aforementioned higher forms, but instead in certain lower-level forms. The present paper asks and answers why certain emotions can be considered to be cognitive in such lower-level forms.