Uniqueness , and Symmetry of Free - Entry Cournot Equilibrium :
نویسنده
چکیده
This article adds technology choice to a free-entry Cournot model with linear demand and constant marginal costs. Firms can choose from a discrete set of technologies. This simple framework yields non-existence of equilibrium, existence of multiple equilibria and equilibria in which ex-ante identical ̄rms choose di®erent technologies as possible outcomes. I provide a full characterization of the parameter sets for which these outcomes arise. The (non-)existence problem disappears if vertical market size is large. Non-existence is largely a 'small number' phenomenon. Asymmetric equilibria emerge either because of indivisibilities or due to similarity of di®erent technologies in terms of the average costs realized. JEL Classi ̄cation: D43; L13
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