Did Frege Believe Frege's Principle?

نویسنده

  • Francis Jeffry Pelletier
چکیده

In this essay I will consider two theses that are associated with Frege, and will investigate the extent to which Frege “really” believed them. Much of what I have to say will come as no surprise to scholars of the historical Frege. But Frege is not only a historical figure; he also occupies a site on the philosophical landscape that has allowed his doctrines to seep into the subconscious water table. And scholars in a wide variety of different scholarly establishments then sip from these doctrines. I believe that some Frege-interested philosophers at various of these establishments might find my conclusions surprising. Some of these philosophical establishments have arisen from an educational milieu in which Frege is associated with some specific doctrine at the expense of not even being aware of other milieux where other specific doctrines are given sole prominence. The two theses which I will discuss illustrate this point. Each of them is called “Frege’s Principle,” but by philosophers from different milieux. By calling them “milieux” I do not want to convey the idea that they are each located at some specific socio-politico-geographico-temporal location. Rather, it is a matter of their each being located at different places on the intellectual landscape. For this reason one might (and I sometimes will) call them “(interpretative) traditions.”

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Journal of Logic, Language and Information

دوره 10  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2001