Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study dynamic bargaining with private information and a deadline. As commitment power disappears, there is a clear "deadline effect" that is, trade takes place smoothly before the deadline and with an atom right at the deadline. Prices, timing of trade and the deadline effect respond to the consequences of not reaching an agreement. Bleaker disagreement options lead to more trade and proportionally more of the agreements taking place in the verge of the deadline. Time to deadline can affect the overall effi ciency of the equilibrium non-monotonically. For intermediate deadlines, effi ciency is improved if agents face bleaker prospects after deadline.
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تاریخ انتشار 2012