Competing Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper shows that larger auctions are more ef cient than smaller ones, but that despite this scale effect, two competing and otherwise identicalmarkets or auction sites of different sizes can coexist in equilibrium. We nd that the range of equilibrium market sizes depends on the aggregate buyer–seller ratio, and also whether the markets are especially thin. (JEL: D44, L11)
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