The Functions of the Social Bond

Travis Hirschi's control or social bonding theory argues that those persons who have strong and abiding attachments to conventional society (in the form of attaciuIlcnts, involvement, investment, and belief) are less likely to deviate than persons who have weak or shallow bonds. Later, Gottfredson and Hirschi moved away from the social bond as the primary factor in deviance, and toward an emphasis on self-control. In short, low self-control is associated with higher levels of deviance and criminality irrespective of the strength or weakness of one's social bonds. In this article I argue that Talcott Parsons' AGIL schema easily incorporates Hirschi's social bond into its broader analytical framework. Flllthermore, from within the logical framework of Parsons' system, Hirschi's move from an emphasis on social bonds to an emphasis on self-control is wholly compatible with, and even anticipated by, the AGIL schema. The article illustrates, and argues for, the continuing importance of theoretical subsumption in sociology and criminology. Lastly, a set of testable hypotheses is generated based upon this theoretical retornmlation. INTRODUCTION: CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY AND THEORETICAL SUBSUMPTION Criminological theories are, by their very essence, middle-range (or lower--level) theo-ries, which seek to explain those specifiC features of human social systems related to criminality.l The aspect" of crime or the criminal that are pertinent to any particular criminological theory are established by way of the theory's initial and scope conditions, whether these are stated formally or discursively (see Smelser 1969; Walker and Cohen 1985; Gibbs 1994; Wagner 2000). }"lost proponents of this middle-orange approach to criminological theory argue that criminal behavior is a complex affair that requires specialized, lower--level theories to adequately deal with the specific types of human conduct and social situations that are said to be characteristic of criminality or deviance. Among the competing visions of 'ivhat the proper aims of science are or should be, one of the better known is the ideal of a comprehensive or "grand" theory that would integrate all the domains of science in terms of a common set of principles. This comprehensive theory would in effect serve as the foundation for all less--inclusive theories (Hovard 1971).1 In his discussion of theoretical reduction or subsumption, Nagel (1979:3367) states that " . . . in any case, the phenomenon of a relatively autono mous theory becoming absorbed by, or reduced to, some other more inclusive theory is an undeniable and recurrent feature of the history of modern science," and "there is every reason to suppose that such reduction will continue to take place in the future." ~For their helpful suggestions for improvement of earlier versions of this paper, I thank Teresa laGrange, Thomas Farara, Victor Lidz, and the three anonymous reviewers of The Sociological Quarterl}: Direct all correspondence to James I. Chriss, Department of Sociology, 2121 Euclid Ave., Cleveland, 0 H H115; e-mail: [email protected] Talcott Parsons spenl a long career producing such a general theory, one which he claimed was inclusive enough lo provide explanalions not only for all of sociology's major phenomena, but for those of neighboring social and behavioral sciences as well (see, e.g., Parsons 1991). Notwithstanding the bombasl and sociological imperialism of some aspecL':I of Parsons' theorelical agenda, no one in sociology has yet to malch Parsons' accomplishments in suslaining a viable program of grand, general, or syslems theory (Miinch 1981, 1982; Alexander 1983; Hamilton 1996; Lidz 2000; Trevino 2001). Much of the criticism and ultimate rejection of Parsons lhal occurred beginning in the late 1950s was based on ideological or noncognitive points of contention (see especially Mills 1959; Gouldner 1970) as much as (or more lhan) on cognilive criteria (Le., rigorous tests of elements of the theory byway of the criteria oflogical analysis, cognitive significance, or predictive power; see Hempel 1965; Stinchcombe 1968; Dubin 1969; Gibbs 1972; Cohen 1989).3 The revival of interesl in Parsons' body of work has been steadily growing since the early 1980s, and, concomitantly, issues that were once considered "settled" are being revisited anew. Theorelical reduclion is one such issue that deserves to be revisiled. Il is in this spirit that I describe Hirschi's (1969) control theory and hiler self-conlrol theory (Gollfredson and Hirschi 1990) as subsumable under Parsons' general theory. HIRSCHI AND PARSONS: A LITERATURE REVIEW It has been over 35 years since Travis Hirschi (1969) first presented his widely discussed and influential control theory ofdelinquency and crime. Tntereslingly, however, during all Lbis time Lbere has been no explicit recognition-either byHirschi himself or by others in the criminology or social lheory fields -----of the sharp convergence belween Hirschi's notion of lhe four dimensions of the social bond and Talcott Parsons' AGJL schema. I say this, of course, knowing fully well the vastness of the lilerature, as bOlb Hirschi and Parsons are heavily discussed and cited aULbors. Il is certainly possible Lbat somewhere someone has acknowledged lheir convergence in print.. However, no one in the major criminology, criminal justice, and sociology journals that I have reviewed has done so. Nevertheless, a fe"w authors have noted broad parallels between Parsons and Hirschi, and these deserve brief mention. In his overview and SUllllllary of the concept of social control, Robert !v'leier (1982) argues that Parsons' notion of social control was part of the functionalist response, "Ilhich made explicit, much more so than in previous formulations, the association between social control and deviance. Parsons and the functionalists conceptualized society as a more or less stable system which, in order to counteract deviant or destabilizing tendencies, evolved sanctioning mechanisms for the purpose of restoring and maintaining the orderly operation of the system. It is then a small step to go from explicitly linking social control and deviance functionally to a normative conception of deviance and social control (following Durkheim and Freud), whereby deviance and social control are both explained as outcomes of socialization: When socialization ,,,corks well, persons are drawn into closer contact with conventional society (Meier 1982:46). This latter move is, in essence, the control theory of Hirschi (1969). Here, we see Meier linking Parsons to Hirschi indirectly through the socialization theories of Durkheim and Freud. This is similar to lhe argument of Debra Umberson (1987), who argues for lhe indirect inl1uence of social conlrol as experienced through informal pressures to conform as exerted prirr1'lrily through the family. Umberson (1987 :309) groups Parsons and Hirschi (along with a few olhers) under this model of self-control atlained through socialization and the internalizalion of norms and values within the context of family and olher informal agents of controL In a similar vein, Charles Tiltle (1977) proposes a list of variables, representing various theoretical and research traditions, which has been used to explain some aspect of confonnilY and its counlerparl, deviance. For example, functionalist theorist,;;, led by Parsons, argue moral commilment to norms and values is one of the primary determinants of conformity. Another theoretical tradilion, which Tittle refers to as social inte· gralion, emphasizes the importance of relational bonds in reducing or checking deviance. The classical innovator of this tradition is Durkheim, and Hirschi follows his lead by stressing the exlent of individual integration into ongoing group life as the prime determinanl of the willingness lo conform (Tiltle 1977:581). Again, although TillIe does not make explicit the connection between Parsons and Hirschi in this article, their indirecllinkage through Durkheim is readily visible. Tn addition to these articles, there have been several attempls to integrate social control theory with olher prominent lheories of delinquency and crime, including labeling, social learning, rouline activities, ditTerential association, and strain or anomie theory (see, e.g., Cernkovich 1978; Aultman and \'Vellford 1979; Segrave and Haslad 1983; Giordano 1989; Fararo and Skvoretz 1997; Akers 1998; Hawdon 1999; for a summary of this literalure, see Liska, Krohn, and Messner 1989; Williams and :rv1cShane 1999:201-202). However, none of Lbese works deal explicitly with Parsons. THE ElEMENTS OF THE SOCIAL BOND Going beyond prior analyses, which hint at parallels between Parsons and Hirschi, I argue that there exists a deep and abiding linkage between the two theorists. The explicit point of contact is the close correspondence between Hirschi's four dimensions of the social bond and the four functions of Parsons' AGIL schema. Not only is Hirschi's control (or social bond) theory subsumable under Parsons' more general and abstract .AGIL theory; his later turn toward an emphasis on self-control (see, e.g., Hirschi and Gottti'edson2000) is wholly predictable based upon the logic and framework of Parsons' elaboration of the cybernetic schema, which in effect clarifies the analytical relations among the four functions. The alignment of the dimensions of the social bond and the functions is as follmvs: attachment serves the function of integration 0); commitment serves the function of goal-attainment (G); involvement serves the function of adaptation (A); and beliefserves the function of latent pattern-maintenance (L). This will be elaborated more fully shortly. TABLE 1. Elements of the Social Bond' Level Element Description Behavioral Involvement Time spent in conventional activities Cognitive Commitment Rational calculation of the costs of lawbreaking for future goals Affective Attadlment Emotional closeness to family, peers, and sdlOols Evaluative Belief Ideas that suprorl a conventional orientation 'Adapted from Hirschi (1969) and Livingston (1996). Hirschi's social control theory is in essence an extension and refinement of Durkheim's ([1897] 1951) notion that persons are more likely to deviate \vhen they are poorly integrated into ongoing group relations. Indeed, Hirschi (1969:16) ciles apprm'-ingly the tollowing passage from Durkheim ([1897] 1951 :209): The more weakened the groups to which [lhe individual] belongs, the less he depends on them, the more he consequently depends only on himself and recognizes no other rules of conducllhan whal are founded on his privale interests. Hence, control theory assumes that deviance------Dr delinquency specifically for purposes of Hirschi's argument-------results 'ivhen an individual's bond to conventional sociely is weak or broken. This concept~ the social bond, is the central analytic in Hirschi's schema. Hirschi's control theory is summarized in Table l. To summarize briefly, Hirschi suggest" that the more attached persons are to other members of society, the more they believe in the values of conventional society, and the more they invest in and are involved in conventiona llines of activity, the less likely they are lo deviate. Needless to say, there has been an enormous amount writlen over the years about Hirschi's social bonding theory and later general theory of crime (which shifts the focus from social conlrol to self-control). Tests of the theories have produced a'ivide assortment offindings, much of which are supportive, \vhile others are mixed or negative (see, e.g., Hindelang 1973; Hagan and Simpson 1977; 'Viatrowski, Griswold, and Roberts 1981; Matsueda 1982; Thompson, Mitchell, and Dodder 1984; Greenberg 1985; Fried man and Rosenbaum 1988; LaGrange and Silverman 1999; Geis 2000; Nakhaie, Silverman, and LaCrange. 2000; Marcus 2004). :tvly purpose here, ho-wever, is not to contribute to the already vast literature regarding the veracity, validity, reliability, or utility of Hirschi's control theory. Rather, I intend to show that Hirschi's earlier control theory, as well as GoUfredson's and Hirschi's later general theory of crime (which emphasizes self-control rather than social bonds), are both special cases of, and can be subsumed under, Parsons' AGIL schema and his later cybernetic hierarchy of control. PARSONS' FOUR PHASES Although some authors make the claim that Parsons' turn to cybernetics later in his career represents an analytical break from functionalism per se, I would argue that Parsons' cybernetic turn supplements, but does not replace, the basic functionalist orientation of his general theoretical project. Peter Hamilton (1996) concisely captured the various phases of Parsons' career, referring to them as Parsonsc, Parsons\ Parsons, and Parsons• Parsonsc represenls the earliesl, preparatory phase of Parsons' career (before 1935), where his major contributions were not only in the field of economics but also in social lheory (e.g., his lranslation into English of\'Veber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit ofCapitalism in 1930). The nexl phase, Parsons\ running from Lbe publication of Structure ofSocial Action in 1937 on lhrough to the mid--1940s, represents the beginnings of Parsons' generallheoretical project, particularly as this relaled to the developmenl of a voluntaristic theory of action, which sought to incorporate subjectivist elements that had been "squeezed oul" of theories of human action under the sway of positivism, behaviorism, and ulilitarianism. The full elaboration of a functionalisl and social systems orienlalion was launched in the Parsons2 phase, represented in the works of Parsons and his collaborators published in lhe decade from 1951 lhrough the early 1960s. Finally, Parsons\ the cybernelic phase, ran from the mid-1960s until Parsons' death in 1979. Even with the advenl of the last Parsonsc> phase, however, commitrnent to the major aspecls of funclionalist theorizing, especially Lbe AGJL schema, remained intact. What the cybernetic turn accomplished for Parsons was the clarification of lhe relationship between the four functions within various subsystems of the social system, as well as the human social system in relation to the cosmos and beyond, as represented in the "lmman condition" paradigm, the final elaboration of Parsons' (1978) grand lheory. In Lbis last phase, Parsons was influenced most directly by Norbert \Viener (1961), who pioneered the application of cybernetics to explanations in social science. The cybernetic principle slates simply "things high in information control things high in energy." A good example of this principle is Lbe thermostat. A thermostal is high in information in that if il is set at 68 degrees, it will regulate the heat of the room, which is high in energy. Cybernetics assumes Lbat human and nonhuman organizations constitute systems which are goalseeking and which atlempt lo maintain a moving or slable state equilibrium, such as lhe thermostat maintaining the room's temperature at 68 degrees (Deutsch 1963:95). As depicted in Figure 1, lhe four subsystems of lhe hUII1'ln condition represenllhe mosl general level possible for purposes of social analysis in that there is a physical or chemical realm (A), an organic realm (G), an action realm (1), and a nonempirical realm (the telic system, which serves the L-function). If one begins at lhis most abstract, human condition level, one may then descend to lower analytical levels by way of any selected subsystem. In Figure 1, the I-subsystem of the human condition, namely the action system, can be broken dmvn into its own subsystems (depicted in the box on the bottom right portion of the fit=:,'1lre), each serving one of the four functions of AGIL. One may then continue on and select one of these subsystems (the social system for example), which again can be broken dm"rn into a still lower-level subsystem (the box on the bottom left), and so on. Parsons argued that with regard to the frame of reference of the general action system, the cultural system (L) stands at the pinnacle of the cybernetic hierarchy because it is high in information and "controls" virtually everything connected with the meaningful and purposive behavior of human beings . .? With the function of latent patternmaintenance standing at the top of the cybernetic hierarchy, the next level down is the function of integration (I), which at the frame of reference of the general action system