Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection Author(s):
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Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive o...
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تاریخ انتشار 2009