Intersubjectivity: Exploring Consciousness from the Second-person Perspective

Today, the study of consciousness within Western science and philosophy is polarized between investigations of third-person, objective, correlates (e.g., neuroscience and cognitive science) and investigations of first-person, subjective experience and phenomena (e.g., introspection and ~edita­ tion). These two perspectives set the terms of debate in contemporary consciousness research: Is consciousness first-person subjective or third-person objective? How can we bridge the "explanatory gap" between objective brains and subjective minds? Although many participants in this debate recognize that a comprehensive study of consciousness must include both firstand third-person perspectives (some still hold dogmatically to one perspective or the other), few are exploring consciousness from the second-person perspective. Although the second-person perspective has been almost entirely overlooked in Western philosophy, the notion of intcrsubjectivity has actually had significant proponents in other disciplinessuch as linguistics, social psychology, psychotherapy, and anthropology. The author proposes that intersubjectivity is a foundation to both a philosophical understanding of and an experiential engagement with transpersonal phenomena. Having clarified what he means by the key terms "consciousness," "subjectivity," and "intersubjeetivity," the author gives a rationale for a second-person approach to consciousness studies, then surveys significant historical precursors to the notion of intersubjectivity in Western philosophy and proposes an evolutionary model of consciousness based on a distinction between intersubjective and interpersonal consciousness-a model that provides a philosophical foundation for the core insights of transpersonal psychology. In the conclusion, some possible objections to intersubjectivity are addressed and implications for a second-person methodology are considered.