Do Players’ Beliefs or Risk attitudes determine the Equilibrium selections in 2x2 coordination Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
This study focuses on the question whether risk aversion or beliefs of players explain the strategic choices in 2x2 coordination games. In a laboratory experiment we elicit the risk attitudes by using lottery choices. Furthermore, using a quadratic scoring rule, subjects’ beliefs about the choice of the opponent are elicited directly. Our data show that participants’ behavior is not explained by risk attitude, but rather is it best response to their stated first order beliefs. Higher order beliefs follow different patterns which are in most cases in contrast to Bayesian updating. JEL-CLASSIFICATION: D 81, C 91, C 72
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