Distributed Resource Governance Using Asymmetric Anonymity

This research proposes a novel method for ensuring fair governance of a common resource using asymmetric anonymity. We propose a system of resource governance that uses anonymous auditors instead of a regulatory agency. Self-enforcement and mutual enforcement are subject to fraud and collusion. In the proposed governance system, anonymity, often associated with negative online interactions, is employed in an asymmetric manner to mitigate these negative effects. This is done by assigning random anonymous auditors to a resource claimant. The claimant’s identity is known to the auditor. However, auditors’ identities are hidden from both the claimant and other auditors. Cheating, along with improper auditing, will result in penalties for both auditor and claimant. Improper auditing consists not only of allowing unlawful resource use, but also denying lawful use. This paper presents a proof of concept simulation using autonomous software agents and lays out the design for future experiments.