The Roommates Problem Discussed
نویسنده
چکیده
The stable roommates problem as originally posed by Gale and Shapley [1] in 1962 involves a single set of even cardinality 2n, each member of which ranks every other member in order of preference. A stable matching is then a partition of this single set into n pairs such that no two unmatched members both prefer each other to their partners under the matching. However, a simple counterexample quickly proves that a stable matching need not exist in the stable roommates problem. In 1984, Irving published an algorithm that determines in polynomial time if a stable matching is possible on a given set, and if so, finds such a matching. However, others have made efforts to redefine the concept of a “stable matching,” or even reframe the problem altogether to give it new real-world significance. The present paper describes both Irving’s algorithm, and look at other reappraisals of this problem.
منابع مشابه
An Upper Bound for the Solvability Probability of a Random Stable Roommates Instance
It is well-known that not all instances of the stable roommates problem admit a stable matching. Here we establish the first nontrivial upper bound on the limiting behavior of P,,, the probability that a random roommates instance of size n has a stable matching, namely, limn-P,, I el% (=0.8244. . .).
متن کاملThe Popular Roommates problem
We consider the popular matching problem in a roommates instance G = (V,E) with strict preference lists. While popular matchings always exist in a bipartite instance, they need not exist in a roommates instance. The complexity of the popular matching problem in a roommates instance has been an open problem for several years and here we show it is NP-hard. A sub-class of max-size popular matchin...
متن کاملRepresenting roommates' preferences with symmetric utilities
In the context of the stable roommates problem, it is shown that acyclicity of preferences is equivalent to the existence of symmetric utility functions, i.e. the utility of agent i when matched with j is the same as j’s utility when matched with i. © 2007 Published by Elsevier Inc. JEL classification: C78
متن کاملOn a cutting plane heuristic for the stable roommates problem and its applications
We propose a new cutting plane heuristic for the classical stable roommates problem. Our approach utilises a new linear programming formulation for the problem, and the underlying geometric properties of the fractional solution to construct the violated inequality. We test the approach on moderate size problems, with encouraging computational performance. To further illustrate the versatility o...
متن کاملAn algorithm for a super-stable roommates problem
In this paper we describe an efficient algorithm that decides if a stable matching exists for a generalized stable roommates problem, where, instead of linear preferences, agents have partial preference orders on potential partners. Furthermore, we may forbid certain partnerships, that is, we are looking for a matching such that none of the matched pairs is forbidden, and yet, no blocking pair ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008