Harsanyi Values of Large Economies: Nonequivalence to Competitive Equilibria
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چکیده
We consider economies with many agents and compare the competitive equilibria and the value allocations of the resultingcoalitional games. In particular, we provide a (smooth and robust) example where the “value principle” does not hold for the HarsanyiNTU-value: there is a unique competitive equilibrium,which however does notbelong tothe (nonempty) set of Harsanyi value allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D51. © 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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تاریخ انتشار 1996