The In-Supporting Content of the Extended Mind

The thesis of the extended mind has been upheld for a decade and defended seriously (Clark 1995, 1997ab, 1999ab, 2001ab, 2001ab, 2002, 2003; Clark and Chalmers 1998; Dennett 1996, 1998, 2000; Millikan 1995). However, there seems to have been little attention addressed to the sense in which the extended mind can have content, and the role of internal mentality standing in the unfolding of the extended mind seems to have been underestimated. Dennett regards the mind as consisting of internalized tools. Clark claims that the (internal) mind is non-privileged compared to the external resources of the extended mind. The present paper provides a different perspective: the extended mind indeed has an inner core that has a distinctive role in the extended mind’s course of unfolding, to wit, to maintain a novel sense of content–the in-supporting content—as smoothly and flexibly as possible. Such content is conceived of as ways of organizing activities: when the extended mind unfolds, it remains holding an inner core that constantly serves to organize internal mental resources (including internalized resources) in support of the agent’s problem-solving performance in the environment and/or cultural settings. The existence of that distinctive role, this paper argues, certifies that the extended mind has an inner core that is reasonably privileged compared to external resources.