A Population-centric Approach to the Beauty Contest Game
نویسنده
چکیده
An evolutionary game-theoretic analysis for a version of the p-beauty prize game is given for the two-player, finite population, and infinite population cases. Winning strategies are characterized in terms of iterative thinking relative to the population.
منابع مشابه
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تاریخ انتشار 2010