The Economic Consequences of Electoral Accountability Revisited
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper revisits the impact of electoral accountability on total state expenditure and tax revenue with panel data from the 48 continental U.S. states from 1950 to 1999. Besides examining “traditional” tests of sensitivity, we present estimates from a difference-in-differences propensity score matching model (DD PSM) and a parametric difference-in-differences-in-differences approach (DDD) that relaxes the identification assumptions beyond those required in the matching model. We find that the estimated term limit impact is highly sensitive to modeling changes: while the effects of a binding term limit on total state expenditure and tax revenue documented in the literature are not robust to the expansion of the conditioning set, specifications requiring less stringent identification assumptions indicate that term limit effects are even stronger than previously documented, especially on tax policy. These results reinforce political reputation building models as a fruitful avenue to understanding political competition.
منابع مشابه
Preferring a Pound of Cure to an Ounce of Prevention: Retrospective Voting and Failures in Electoral Accountability
Do voters effectively hold elected officials accountable for policy decisions? What are the consequences of failures in electoral accountability? Using a novel dataset on natural disasters, government spending, and election returns, we show that voters reward incumbents for delivering disaster relief spending but not for investing in disaster prevention spending. This failure of electoral accou...
متن کاملCrossing Party Lines: The Effects of Information on Redistributive Politics.
Many lament that weak accountability and poor governance impede economic development in Africa. Politicians rely on ethnic allegiances that deliver the vote irrespective of performance, dampening electoral incentives. Giving voters information about candidate competence counters ethnic loyalty and strengthens accountability. I extend a canonical electoral model to show how information provision...
متن کاملElectoral Accountability in Context: How Political Institutions Condition Performance Voting
The idea that voters use elections to hold governments to account for their performance lies at the heart of democratic theory, and countless studies have shown that economic performance can predict support for incumbents. Importantly, however, recent literature has shown that the link between economic performance and vote electoral outcomes is conditioned by countries " institutional setup ,...
متن کاملThe Twilight of Westminster ? Electoral Reform & its Consequences
The UK political system has long exemplified ‘majoritarian’ or ‘Westminster’ government, a type subsequently exported to many Commonwealth countries. The primary advantage of this system, proponents since Bagehot have argued, lie in its ability to combine accountability with effective governance. Yet under the Blair administration, this system has undergone a series of major constitutional refo...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2004