The Economic Consequences of Electoral Accountability Revisited

نویسندگان

  • Daniel L. Millimet
  • Daniel M. Sturm
چکیده

This paper revisits the impact of electoral accountability on total state expenditure and tax revenue with panel data from the 48 continental U.S. states from 1950 to 1999. Besides examining “traditional” tests of sensitivity, we present estimates from a difference-in-differences propensity score matching model (DD PSM) and a parametric difference-in-differences-in-differences approach (DDD) that relaxes the identification assumptions beyond those required in the matching model. We find that the estimated term limit impact is highly sensitive to modeling changes: while the effects of a binding term limit on total state expenditure and tax revenue documented in the literature are not robust to the expansion of the conditioning set, specifications requiring less stringent identification assumptions indicate that term limit effects are even stronger than previously documented, especially on tax policy. These results reinforce political reputation building models as a fruitful avenue to understanding political competition.

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تاریخ انتشار 2004