Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives
نویسندگان
چکیده
We analyze bilateral bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. We look for “good” ordinal solutions to such problems and show that Unanimity Compromise and Rational Compromise are the only bargaining rules that satisfy a basic set of properties. We then extend our analysis to admit problems with countably infinite alternatives. We show that, on this class, no bargaining rule choosing finite subsets of alternatives can be neutral. When rephrased in the utility framework of Nash (1950), this implies that there is no ordinal bargaining rule that is finite-valued.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 28 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007