Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters

A Study of Factors that Influenced Voters’ Behaviour: A Case of Billiri Local Government (2019 General Elections)

An Analysis of the Influence of Radio Political Campaign Messages on Voters’ Electoral Behavior in Kano, Nigeria

This paper will examine the influence of radio political campaign messages on the electorates’ voting behavior in Kano – Nigeria, with a focus on the 2015 general elections. It seeks to ascertain the extent that the electorates in Kano – Nigeria were exposed to radio political campaign messages, as well as the extent to which such messages influenced their voting decisions. Equally, the study c...

Multiple Referenda and Multiwinner Elections Using Hamming Distances: Complexity and Manipulability

We study multiple referenda and committee elections, when the ballot of each voter is simply a set of approved binary issues (or candidates). Two well-known rules under this model are the commonly used candidate-wise majority, also called the minisum rule, as well as the minimax rule. In the former, the elected committee consists of the candidates approved by a majority of voters, whereas the l...

Asymptotic collusion-proofness of voting rules: the case of large number of candidates

We study manipulability in elections when the number of candidates is large. Elections with a large number of voters have been studied in the literature and the focus of this paper is on studying election with a large number of candidates. Manipulability, when the number of candidates is large, is significant in the context of computational social choice. Our investigation in this paper covers ...

Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules

We provide exact relations giving the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation of three specific social choice functions (Borda rule, Copeland rule, Plurality rule) in three-alternative elections when the notion of self-selectivity is imposed. The results suggest that the Borda rule is more vulnerable to coalitional manipulation than the Copeland rule and the Plurality rule. Howev...