Optimal Disclosure of Costly Information Packages in Auctions∗

Information Disclosure as a Matching Mechanism: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment∗

Market outcomes depend on the quality of information available to its participants. We measure the effect of information disclosure on market outcomes using a large-scale field experiment that randomly discloses information about quality in wholesale automobile auctions. As the theoretical literature predicts, information disclosure increases expected revenues. However, in contrast with convent...

Three Essays on Auctions

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ACKNOWLEDGEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi 1.0 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2.0 ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF A BIDDING RING . . . . . . . . . 3 ...

The Relation Between Bank Resolutions and Information Environment: Evidence from the Auctions for Failed Banks

This study examines the impact of disclosure requirements on the resolution costs of failed banks. Consistent with the hypothesis that disclosure requirements mitigate information asymmetries in the auctions for failed banks, I find that when failed banks are subject to more comprehensive disclosure requirements, regulators incur lower costs of closing a bank and retain a lower portion of the f...

A Comparative Study of Multi-Attribute Continuous Double Auction Mechanisms

Auctions have been as a competitive method of buying and selling valuable or rare items for a long time. Single-sided auctions in which participants negotiate on a single attribute (e.g. price) are very popular. Double auctions and negotiation on multiple attributes create more advantages compared to single-sided and single-attribute auctions. Nonetheless, this adds the complexity of the auctio...

Essays on Information Disclosure in Auctions and Contests