Decentralized Forestry in Guatemala: a Test of Polycentric Governance Theory

What are the drivers of sub-national variation in forestry outcomes under a uniform national decentralization policy? The literature on decentralized governance of natural resources in developing countries is decidedly mixed in terms of theory and findings. Some scholars argue that decentralization reforms will lead to improved policy outcomes, other scholars view decentralization with great skepticism, and a third group believes that whether governance reforms will lead to positive or negative environmental outcomes is conditional on an array of ancillary factors. Unfortunately, many empirical investigations of decentralization’s effects fail to evaluate these competing explanations under circumstances where there are tangible tradeoffs pushing actors toward disparate environmental outcomes. Our contribution to this policyrelevant debate involves innovations in both theory and empirics. First, this study builds upon and applies polycentric governance theory, arguing that the strength of connections between actors across levels of government shapes forest cover change under decentralization. Specifically, we hypothesize that municipalities exhibiting higher levels of polycentricity will be more effective in improving forest conditions. Second, we test this theory using a unique longitudinal dataset on forestry governance for 100 municipalities in Guatemala, combining socio-economic information, two waves of surveys with mayors, and remote-sensed data on forest change over twenty years. Preliminary results suggest that governance systems characterized by higher polycentricity are able to counteract the pressures towards deforestation when agriculture is important for a municipality, whereas those with lower polycentricity are not.