Smoothing approach to Nash equilibrium formulations for a class of equilibrium problems with shared complementarity constraints

نویسندگان

  • Ming Hu
  • Masao Fukushima
چکیده

The equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) can be looked on as a generalization of Nash equilibrium problem (NEP) and the mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) whose constraints contain a parametric variational inequality or complementarity system. In this paper, we particularly consider a special class of EPECs where a common parametric P-matrix linear complementarity system is contained in all players’ strategy sets. After reformulating the EPEC as an equivalent NEP, we use a smoothing method to construct a sequence of smoothed NEPs that approximate the original problem. We consider two solution concepts, global Nash equilibrium and stationary Nash equilibrium, and establish some results about the convergence of approximate Nash equilibria. keywords: Equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints, Nash equilibrium problem, Pmatrix linear complementarity problem, smoothing approximation, global Nash equilibrium, stationary Nash equilibrium.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Comp. Opt. and Appl.

دوره 52  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2012