Optimal collective dichotomous choice under quota constraints

نویسندگان

  • Ruth Ben-Yashar
  • Sarit Kraus
  • S. Kraus
چکیده

This paper presents optimal collective dichotomous choices under quota constraints. We focus on committees that have to decide whether to accept or reject a set of projects under quota constraints. We provide a method for optimal ranking of projects which is suitable for solving this problem. The main result generalizes a number of earlier results in the subject. To outline the applicability of our method, we demonstrate its usage in the area of information filtering.

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تاریخ انتشار 2002