An error in the mixed adversary protocol by Fitzi, Hirt and Maurer
نویسنده
چکیده
We point out an error in the protocol for mixed adversaries and zero error from the Crypto 98 paper by Fitzi, Hirt and Maurer. We show that the protocol only works under a stronger requirement on the adversary than the one claimed. Hence the bound on the adversary’s corruption capability given there is not tight. Subsequent work has shown, however, a new bound which is indeed tight.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive
دوره 1999 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 1999