Moral Status As a Matter of Degree?

Some people contend t h a t fetuses have moral s ta tus but less t h a n t h a t of paradigm persons. Many people hold views implying that sent ient animals have moral s t a t u s but less t h a n that of persons. These positions suggest tha t moral s ta tus admits of degrees. Does it? To address this question, we must first clarify what it means to speak of degrees of moral status. The paper begins by clarifying the more basic concept of moral s ta tus and presenting two models of degrees of moral status. I t then sketches several significant considerations in favor of, and several against, the assertion of degrees of moral status. The paper concludes by drawing lessons from the discussion. Despite the political polarization of the abortion issue, there has been considerable attention in recent decades to the moderate thesis that human fetuses, or a t least some fetuses, have moral status but less than that of paradigm persons.’ If this thesis is correct, there are degrees of moral status; the latter isn’t all-or-nothing. Also in recent decades, the claim that sentient nonhuman animals deserve moral consideration on account of their interests or welfare-and not merely for humancentered reasons-has become much more widely accepted.2 Many who embrace this claim, however, would deny that animals’ moral s ta tus equals tha t of human persons. Their position, too, suggests that moral status admits of degrees. David DeGrazia is Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy, George Washington University. His publications include Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status (Cambridge University Press, 1996) and Human Identity and Bioethics (Cambridge University Press, 2005). His research has been supported by fellowships from the American Council of Learned Societies, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the National Institutes of Health.