Pre-print draft of FROM SOCIAL INTERACTION TO INDIVIDUAL REASONING: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF A POSSIBLE SOCIO-CULTURAL MODEL OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

This study explores the theory that individual reasoning ability, as measured using standard reasoning tests, has part of its origin in dialogue with others. In the study 64 eight and nine year old children were taught the use of 'Exploratory talk', a type of talk in which joint reasoning is made explicit. The relationship between the talk of the children and the solving of Raven's test problems was followed using discourse analysis of groups working together. The findings of the study support four claims: that use of exploratory talk can improve group reasoning, that exploratory talk can be taught, that the teaching of exploratory talk can successfully transfer between educational contexts and that individual results on a standard non-verbal reasoning test significantly improved as a result of the intervention teaching exploratory talk. Our results offer support to the hypothesis that experience of social reasoning can improve scores on measures of individual reasoning. The stronger hypothesis that general cognitive development is a product of induction into social reasoning is not supported. From Social Interaction to Individual Reasoning: An Empirical Investigation of a Possible Model of Cognitive Development The growing influence of the socio-cultural paradigm has led to several studies of how children and others learn to think in particular ways through being inducted into social practices and ways of using language (see, for example, Rogoff, 1990; Resnick, Levine & Teasley, 1991; Mercer, 1995; Wertsch, 1991). These studies of specific cognitive development raise a question about the possibility of studying cognitive development in general. If learning to think is always induction into a specific social context, then how are we now to understand the findings of non-culturally based research on cognitive development? Gauvain, writing from a socio-cultural perspective, claims that this question poses an important challenge to researchers in the field of learning and instruction: Although the extent to which cultural considerations can be incorporated into traditional views of development is unclear, it would be foolhardy to dismiss a long tradition of careful research rooted in such traditions simply because it did not take into account cultural influences on development. Thus a difficult task for the future is the reconciliation of findings from nonculturally based research with culturally based investigations of the same and related phenomena (Gauvain, 1995, p. 42) In this paper we present a study that, in its theoretical basis, its methods and also its findings, goes some way towards constructing a bridge between a socio-cultural perspective on learning to think and the non-culturally based tradition of research on cognitive development that Gauvain refers to. The study is based on the argument that a type of language use which (following Barnes & Todd, 1977) we call 'exploratory talk' embodies the kind of reasoning which is valued in a range of 'educated' cultural activities. In the study children were taught to use this kind of talk and the effects of this experience on their joint activity and their ability to solve the problems of a standardised psychological test of non-verbal reasoning (in groups and as individuals) were assessed. The test used the Raven's Progressive Matrices is commonly held to test 'the ability to reason and solve problems involving new information' (Carpenter, Just & Shell, 1990, p.404), while also correlating with measures of academic attainment. Analysis of discourse enabled us to relate changes in the way that children talked together while jointly solving the problems of one version of the Raven's test to changes in their individual scores on a second version of the same test. This methodology, combining qualitative discourse analysis with quantitative measurement and controlled experiment, enabled us to explore connections between cultural practice, social interaction and individual development. Theoretical framework The empirical study was designed to explore a model of individual cognitive development that combines a dialogical description of reasoning with a version of Vygotsky's account of individual development. Resnick, Salmon, Zeitz, Wathen, & Holowchak. (1993) argue that whereas traditional psychology has described reasoning in terms of logical rules or other formalisms various trends and arguments in contemporary cognitive psychology point to the need to see reason as a form of social practice. Elsewhere we have argued, influenced by Habermas's concept of communicative rationality (Habermas, 1990, p. 89; White, 1988; Habermas, 1995) and the arguments of other philosophers and communication theorists (for example Rorty, 1991, p. 39; Burbules & Rice, 1992), that to describe reason as a social practice requires a description in terms of inter-personal orientations and associated ground rules (Wegerif & Mercer, 1997a). By labelling our description of reason 'dialogical' we mean that it is not a model of reason drawn from the outside, after the event, as if reason was a closed and finished system, but it is a description of those rules and orientations which inform a type of dialogue from within, specifically those rules and orientations which serve to maintain a free and open encounter between different perspectives and ideas (see Rommetveit, 1992, for further explication of the significance of the move from 'monological' to 'dialogical' accounts of cognition). Vygotsky's model of individual development, which has had a strong influence on the current sociocultural perspective, stresses that: 'all that is internal in the higher mental functions was at one time external' (Vygotsky, 1991, p36). Vygotsky's categories of internal and external have proved problematic for the contemporary socio-cultural perspective. Nonetheless Vygotsky's claim that an individual's ability to perform cognitive tasks when acting alone presupposes and stems from a prior socialisation process is still a basic tenet of the socio-cultural perspective. Some authors, following Leont'ev (1981), refer to the movement of development which Vygotsky called 'internalisation' as a process of the personal appropriation of cultural capital that results from a period of 'guided participation' or 'cognitive apprenticeship' (Rogoff, 1990; Newman, Griffin & Cole, 1989; RojasDrummond, Hernandez, Velez & Villagran, 1998). The dialogical account of reasoning outlined above implies that reasoning is embedded in a social practice. Neo-Vygotskian accounts of individual cognitive development focus on induction into specific social practices. Combining these two views, a dialogical view of reasoning and a neoVygotskian view of development, would lead to the conclusion that learning to reason is essentially induction into a social practice. This model may be an oversimplification but as it is an extrapolation of trends in contemporary theory it is worth articulating and evaluating. In the strong form presented here it is a possible socio-cultural alternative to models of general cognitive development which are central to the non-cultural tradition of developmental psychology. Some of the conceptual issues dealt with only briefly here are considered in more detail in Wegerif (1996a) and in Wegerif & Mercer (1997a). Exploratory talk and reasoning In order to apply and test the theoretical framework we have outlined, the notion of reasoning as a social process has to be specified rather more precisely, in terms of actual situated social practice, than has been done by philosophers such as Habermas and Rorty. To do this we have used the concept of 'exploratory talk’ whose origin lies in empirical studies of classroom discourse. In an article in Learning and Instruction, Mercer (1996a) used observational research in British primary schools to typify three kinds of talk, which he also described as representing different 'social modes of thinking'. 1. The first way of talking is Disputational talk, which is characterised by disagreement and individualised decision making. There are few attempts to pool resources, or to offer constructive criticism of suggestions. [...] Disputational talk also has some characteristic discourse features. notably short exchanges consisting of assertions and counter-assertions. 2. Next there is Cumulative talk, in which speakers build positively but uncritically on what the other has said. Partners use talk to construct a "common knowledge" by accumulation. Cumulative discourse is characterised by repetitions, confirmations and elaborations. [...] 3. Exploratory talk occurs when partners engage critically but constructively with each other's ideas [...] Statements and suggestions are offered for joint consideration. These may be challenged and counter-challenged, but challenges are justified and alternative hypotheses are offered. Compared with the other two types, in exploratory talk knowledge is made more publicly accountable and reasoning is more visible in the talk. Progress then emerges from the eventual joint agreement reached. (Mercer, 1996a, pp. 368-369) These types of talk are discussed and illustrated in detail elsewhere (Mercer, 1995, 1996; Wegerif & Mercer, 1997a). Of the three types we claim that exploratory talk is the closest to reasoning as a social practice. The more detailed elaboration of exploratory talk which follows stems from three influences: conceptual considerations, particular those raised by Habermas (see Wegerif, 1996), the literature on research on effective collaborative learning (see review in Mercer 1995, p. 90-95) and our experience in classrooms working closely with teachers (see Dawes, 1997). Out of this combination of sources the following pragmatic ground rules for exploratory talk are provisionally proposed: 1 all relevant information is shared 2 the group seeks to reach agreement 3 the group takes responsibility for decisions 4 reasons are expected 5 challenges are acceptable 6 alternatives are discussed before a decision is taken 7 all in the group are encouraged to speak by other group members The first three rules in the list are ground rules that are shared with cumulative talk, rules that serve to bind the group, share information together and construct knowledge together through seeking agreement. Rules four and five focus on the explicit reasoning that characterises exploratory talk as opposed to other types of talk. The role of challenges is important in distinguishing between cumulative, disputational and exploratory orientations. In exploratory talk challenges stimulate joint reasoning, in cumulative talk they are experienced as disruptive and often lead to a loss of cooperation and a switch into disputational talk. In disputational talk participants may still offer apparent arguments but are in fact focusing on 'winning' rather than on understanding or solving a problem together. Ground rule six, that alternatives are discussed, reflects the findings of research on collaborative problem solving, particularly that of Kruger (1993) which has found that groups which do best are those which consider alternatives before deciding. In contradistinction to some researchers (e.g. Howe, 1992) we argue that this generation of alternative views does not necessarily imply different initial conception of the problem by the participants in collaboration but can itself be generated by the ground-rules of the talk. Finally rule seven was a product of empirical experience working with groups of children. We found that offering the abstract right to participate, found for example, in Habermas's characterisation of the ideal speech situation (1991, p. 87) was not sufficient. In practice children needed to be actively encouraged to speak and to put forward views by their peers. These ground rules again emphasise our focus on the generative power of the interaction as opposed to an emphasis on the prior dispositions and views of the participants. 'Exploratory talk', in which reasoning is made visible and publicly accountable through the discussion of alternatives, offers us an empirically grounded version of what Habermas calls 'communicative rationality'. Engaging in this type of talk actively constructs participants as ‘reasonable’, (BenHabib, 1992) that is both giving reasons for claims and being open and responsive to the reasoning of others. While communicative rationality of this sort is historically and culturally situated it is nonetheless valued across a wide range of contemporary contexts. The 'exploratory talk' found and promoted in the classroom situation is a version of a type of language use given central importance in contemporary cultural activities such as science, law, government and the negotiation of business.